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Abstract 
During interactions with human consultants, 
people are used to providing partial and/ or 
inaccurate information, and still be under­
stood and assisted. We attempt to em­
ulate this capability of human consultants 
in computer consultation systems. In this 
paper, we present a mechanism for han­
dling uncertainty in plan recognition dur­
ing task-oriented consultations. The uncer­
tainty arises while choosing an appropriate 
interpretation of a user's statements among 
many possible interpretations. Our mecha­
nism handles this uncertainty by using proba­
bility theory to assess the probabilities of the 
interpretations, and complements this assess­
ment by taking into account the information 
content of the interpretations. The informa­
tion content of an interpretation is a mea­
sure of how well defined an interpretation is 
in terms of the actions to be performed on 
the basis of the interpretation. This mea­
sure is used to guide the inference process to­
wards interpretations with a higher informa­
tion content. The information content of an 
interpretation depends on the specificity and 
the strength ofthe inferences in it, where the 
strength of an inference depends on the reli­
ability of the information on which the infer­
ence is based. Our mechanism has been de­
veloped for use in task-oriented consultation 
systems. The domain that we have chosen 
for exploration is that of a travel agency. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
During task-oriented consultations, a consultant needs 
to infer a user's requirements from his/her statements 
in order to provide assistance. To this effect, the con­
sultant needs to interpret a user's statements correctly. 
However, this task is hindered by the fact that people 
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often provide partial and/or inaccurate information. 
This requires the consultant to fill in the missing in­
formation by using different information sources, such 
as knowledge of discourse coherence, domain knowl­
edge and knowledge about the user. However, these 
information sources are not fully reliable, requiring the 
consultant to draw inferences which are inherently un­
certain. As a result, the statements issued by the user 
may be interpreted in more than one way. Hence, the 
consultant needs to evaluate the possible interpreta­
tions and select the most probable one. In this pa­
per, we present a mechanism for handling the uncer­
tainty arising from the lack of reliability of the various 
information sources used by the consultant, and for 
discriminating between multiple interpretations of a 
user's statements. 
An interpretation of a user's statements consists of a 
sequence of plans that the user proposes to carry out, 
and a plan consists of an action with a number of 
parameters defining the action. For instance, in the 
travel domain, the proposal to fly from Melbourne to 
Sydney on December 1st, 1990, is a plan, where flying 
is the action, and the parameters origin, destination 
and departure date are instantiated. 
A number of researchers have used plan recognition 
as a means to response generation during consultation 
(Grosz 1977, Allen and Perrault 1980, Sidner and Is­
rael 1981, Carberry 1983, Litman and Allen 1987, Pol­
lack 1990). However, the models of plan recognition 
developed by these researchers cope only with a single 
interpretation of a user's actions or utterances. Car­
berry (1990) addresses the problem of multiple inter­
pretations by using default inferences, and by applying 
Dempster-Shafer theory of evidence (Section 9.1, Pearl 
1988) to compute plausibility factors of alternate hy­
potheses. However, in domains such as travel, where 
the default assumptions are weak, this approach alone 
does not cope with the problem of multiple interpreta­
tions. Kautz and Allen (1986) use circumscription to 
generate all possible interpretations during story un­
derstanding. However, since all possibilities are con­
structed, and the search is limited only by the struc-
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ture of the plan hierarchy, this approach can be very 
expensive. 
Our mechanism applies Bayesian theory of probability 
in order to address the problem of multiple interpreta­
tions which result from uncertain information sources. 
Probability theory in the form of Bayes Belief Net­
works (Pearl 1988) was applied by Goldman and Char­
niak (1989) to model the difference between the effect 
of objects on plan recognition in stories and in 'real 
life'. In an earlier research, Goldman and Charniak 
(1988) combined probability theory with Assumption­
based TMS (de Kleer 1986) for plan inference during 
story understanding. Our mechanism expands on this 
earlier research with respect to plan inference during 
task-oriented consultations. We have observed that 
in these consultations, the user generally provides suf­
ficient information to enable the consultant to help 
him/her achieve his/her goals. Hence, the better de­
fined the plans in an interpretation, the more likely it 
is that this is the interpretation intended by the user. 
Based on this observation, we augment probabilistic 
reasoning by means of information content consider­
ations, in order to narrow down the number of inter­
pretations produced by the system from a user's state­
ments. The information content of an interpretation 
is a measure of how well defined an interpretation is 
in terms of the actions to be performed on the basis of 
the interpretation. It depends on the specificity and 
the strength of the inferences in it, where the strength 
of an inference depends on the reliability of the infor­
mation source on which it is based. 
The use of information content considerations is valid 
only in intended plan recognition, such as the one oc­
curring in cooperative interactions. In keyhole recog­
nition of plans, where the observer infers an agent's 
plans and goals by unobtrusively observing the agent 
(Schmidt, Sridharan and Goodson 1978), we cannot 
assume the same strong desire for communication and 
hence cannot use the information c
"antent of an inter­
pretation to assess its probability. 
The subsequent sections describe the inference mech­
anism with particular reference to the means used for 
handling the uncertainties arising during the inference 
process. The actual procedures which draw the infer­
ences are discussed in [Raskutti and Zukerman 1991). 
We make use of the following dialogue excerpt to illus­
trate our approach: 
Traveler: "I want to go to Sydney the day after to­
morrow. I am going to Hawaii on the 11:00 am 
flight. By the way, I'll be leaving from Adelaide." 
2 THE INFERENCE MECHANISM 
The inference mechanism operates on input provided 
by a Natural Language Interface (NLI), which con­
sists of predicates, such as FLY and LEAVE, and meta 
predicates that indicate the modality of the state­
ments, such as CAN and MUST. Based on this input, 
it generates the intended plans of the user. The infer­
ence mechanism consists of three processes: ( 1) Direct 
inference, (2) Indirect Inference, and (3) Evaluation of 
interpretations. In these processes, the uncertainties 
arising due to partial and possibly unreliable informa­
tion are handled by using Bayesian theory of probabil­
ity combined with information content considerations. 
The direct inference process generates a set of possible 
interpretations from the input provided by the NLI, 
using definitions of domain actions and coherence con­
siderations. During this stage, there are uncertainties 
arising due to the many possible interpretations of a 
statement as well as due to the many possible rela­
tions between the interpretation of a new statement 
and the previous discourse. For instance, in the above 
dialogue excerpt, there is uncertainty as to which trip 
the departure location 'Adelaide' refers to. This un­
certainty is handled by computing the probability of 
an interpretation of a piece of discourse in terms of the 
probability of an interpretation of each new statement 
(Section 3.1), the probability of an interpretation of 
the previous discourse, and the probability of a rela­
tion between the two (Section 3.2). The calculated 
probabilities are used to prune the set of interpreta­
tions (Section 3.3). 
The interpretations generated by the direct inference 
process are usually incomplete. The unspecified de­
tails are filled in by indirect inferences based on other 
information sources, such as domain knowledge and 
world knowledge. All these sources are not equally re­
liable and hence the strength of these inferences are 
not the same. For instance, the desired mode of trans­
port between Sydney and Hawaii may be inferred by 
taking into consideration typical assumptions about 
the domain. This type of inference is stronger than 
an inference based on general 'world knowledge', but 
weaker than a direct inference. During the indirect in­
ference process, the strength of an inference is used to 
prevent a weaker inference from refuting the results of 
a previous stronger inference (Section 4). 
A measure of information content is used both after 
the direct inference process and during the indirect 
inference process to determine whether the inference 
process should be continued. This measure is also used 
after both the direct and the indirect inference process 
to increase the probability of the interpretations with 
a high information content and to decrease the proba­
bility of those with a low information content (Section 
5). The updated probabilities are used to prune the 
set of interpretations by dropping the interpretations 
with a low probability (Section 3.3). Thus, the eval­
uation process prefers those interpretations that are 
well-defined, i.e., those that were completely specified 
by the user or those in which the gaps left by the user 
could be filled in by using the system's knowledge. 
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3 THE PROBABILITY OF AN 
INTERPRETATION OF THE 
DISCOURSE 
The probability of an interpretation of a set of state­
ments is a measure of how likely it is that the speaker 
intended this interpretation when s/he uttered the 
statements in question. Assume that our discourse 
s' is composed of the previous discourse S and a new 
statement s, where s stands for the input returned by 
the NLI and consists of a predicate and a possibly nil 
meta predicate. Further, assume that S has a set of 
possible interpretations { Ii}, and s has a set of pos­
sible interpretations { ik}. In addition, assume that 
{Rm} is the set of possible relations between an inter­
pretation Ij of S and an interpretation ik of s. Each 
relation Rm is one of the possible discourse relations 
between a statement and previous discourse, namely, 
Elaboration, Introduction and Correction. In addi­
tion, the relations Elaboration and Correction must 
also refer to a topic or plan that is being elaborated or 
corrected. Finally, let D be the set of apriori domain 
knowledge of the listener including the plan-base and 
the rule-base that are used to generate the set of in­
terpretations. Thus, the probability that the speaker 
meant an interpretation Ijkm, consisting of Ij and ik 
and the relation Rm between Ij and ik, when sfhe 
said s' is P(IjkmiS', D). However, since we are deal­
ing with a closed system where the domain knowl­
edge remains constant throughout the interaction, we 
can omit D from our calculations, and focus only on 
P(IjkmiS'). This probability is calculated as follows: 
P(IikmiS') = P(Ij,ik, RmiS,s) 
According to Bayes Rule for conditional probability: 
P(I· IS')= 
P(Ij,ik,Rm,S,s) 
Jkm P(S,s) 
Using Bayes Rule for conditional probability, the nu­
merator can be rewritten as follows: 
P(Ij,ik,Rm,S,s) = 
P(Sis,it,Ij,Rm) * P(siik,Ij,Rm) * 
P(Rmlik,Ii) * P{Ijiik) * P(ik) 
• P(Sis,ik,Ij,Rm) = P(SIIj), since S is con­
ditionally independent of s, ik and Rm, given 
Ij; P(SIIi) indicates the probability that a user 
would utter the statements in discourse S when 
s/he wanted to mean Ij. 
• P(slik, Ij, Rm) = P(slik), since s is conditionally 
independent of Ij and Rm, given ik; P(siik) indi­
cates the probability that a user would utter the 
statement s when s/he wanted to mean ik. 
• P(Iilik) = P(Ij), since Ij is the interpretation of 
statements before s and is independent of ik. 
Using the above results, the expression for P(IjkmiS') 
may be rewritten as follows: 
P(IikmiS') = 
P(SIIi) P(slik) P(Rm lik, Ii) P(Ii) P( ik) 
P(S,s) 
The application of Bayes Rule to the first two terms 
of the numerator yields: 
The terms P(s), P(S) and P(S, s) represent how often 
the statement s, the discourse s and the discourse s' 
consisting of S and s are ever uttered, regardless of the 
purpose for which they are uttered. These probabili­
ties, in general, can be very difficult to estimate. How­
ever, since they are independent of the probabilities of 
the interpretations, and since we are interested in com­
parisons of probabilities and not in absolute values, we 
can define a normalizing constant a, a = P( S) x P(') 
P(S,s) Hence, 
P(Ii IS) is the probability of the interpretation Ij af­
ter processing the discourse S. It is the result of it­
eratively applying the process described here with re­
spect to the statements in discourse S. P( ik is) is the 
probability of an interpretation ik of a user's state­
ments and it is computed as described in Section 3.1 . 
P(Rm lik, Ii) links up the new statement's interpreta­
tion to the interpretation of the earlier discourse by 
means of relation Rm. It is determined as described 
in Section 3.2. The probabilities of the new interpre­
tations, P(IjkmiS'), for all the combinations of {Ij }, 
{ik} and {Rm}, are used to prune the set of interpre­
tations. 
3.1 PROBABILITY OF A N  
INTERPRETATION OF A 
STATEMENT 
The input processed by the inference mechanism is a 
parsed version of the original statements issued by the 
user, and consists of a predicate and a possibly nil 
meta predicate for each statement. During the direct 
inference process, interpretations of an input predicate 
are determined by using an operator library (Fikes and 
Nilsson 1971) and plan inference rules (Allen and Per­
rault 1980). The operator library defines the basic 
actions in the domain. Each operator definition in the 
library consists of the preconditions, effects and body 
of an action, where the body defines the composition 
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of the action. The plan inference rules state that all 
those operators that have the input predicate in their 
precondition, effect or body must be chosen as possible 
interpretations of the predicate. 
The probability of an interpretation ik is determined as 
follows: all the interpretations generated by the same 
rule, e.g., a body rule, are assigned the same probabil­
ity; and as more possibilities are generated, each indi­
vidual one is considered less probable. However, the 
total probability mass allocated to all the interpreta­
tions resulting from the application of a rule depends 
on two factors: ( 1) the meta predicate returned by 
the NLI, and (2) whether other rules gave rise to the 
inference of any interpretations. 
The presence of a meta predicate, such as WANT, en­
ables us to resolve ambiguity when the input predicate 
appears in both the precondition and the effect of an 
operator. For instance, if a user's request about BEing 
at a place is expressed as "I want to be ... " or "I can 
be ... ," but the NLI returns it as BE ( ... ), this predi-
cate can refer either to the precondition or the effect 
of an operator with equal probability. By taking into 
consideration the presence of a meta predicate, we in­
crease the bias towards the appropriate inference rule, 
e.g., if the user had said "I can be ... ," then the prob­
ability mass of the precondition rule would have been 
increased. This scheme is implemented by determin­
ing in advance the manner in which each of the meta 
predicates that may be returned by the NLI affects the 
probability mass assigned to each rule. 
A rule which does not match an input predicate fails 
to infer any interpretations. If one or more rules fail to 
infer interpretations, the probability mass allocated to 
the rules that were successful is modified by allocating 
the apriori mass of the unsuccessful rule proportion­
ally between the successful ones. For instance, if only 
the effect and precondition rules yield interpretations, 
then the probability mass allocated io the body rule 
is 0. This results in the a priori allocation of the body 
rule being split up proportionally between the effect 
and precondition rules. 
These considerations for determining the probability 
of an interpretation are domain independent, since the 
prior probabilities of all the interpretations of a pred­
icate are considered equal, and they are modified us­
ing only meta predicates. At this juncture, if domain 
knowledge is available, it can be used to modify the 
apriori probabilities of the interpretations of a predi­
cate. 
3.2 PROBABILITY OF A RELATION 
The possible discourse relations considered by the in­
ference mechanism are as follows: Elaboration, Cor­
rection, Digression and Introduction. Digression is a 
special case of Elaboration, where the probability of 
elaborating on the last topic is considerably reduced. 
Hence, the relation Rm can only be one of the other 
three. In addition, in the case of Elaboration and Cor­
rection, Rm also includes the topic that is being re­
ferred to. The possible relations and the number of 
topics that can be referred to lead to a large number 
of elements in the set { Rm}. This set is constrained by 
assigning probabilities to the inferred relations so that 
normal patterns of discourse are preferred. The fol­
lowing considerations are used while determining the 
probability of an inferred relation: 
1. When a new statement can be interpreted as elab­
orating on two or more topics discussed earlier, 
the elaboration of the last referenced topic is pre­
ferred to the elaboration of earlier topics. Further, 
the probability of an earlier topic being referred to 
falls exponentially as its distance from the current 
statement increases. 
2. A new statement can always be interpreted as in­
troducing a new topic of discussion. However, 
if the new statement can also be interpreted as 
elaborating on an earlier topic, the probability 
of introduction is considerably reduced. This is 
achieved by assigning a constant and low prob­
ability to the introduction relation. If a highly 
probable elaboration relation is possible, then the 
relative magnitude of the probability of introduc­
tion is reduced. 
3. If there are cue words that indicate a particular re­
lation or that point to a particular previous topic, 
the probability of this relation or this topic in­
creases. For instance, in the statement "By the 
way, I'll be leaving from Adelaide," from the dia­
logue excerpt presented in Section 1, the italicized 
cue phrase indicates a digression. Hence, the pre­
ferred interpretation is that 'Adelaide' refers to 
the trip that was mentioned earlier in the dis­
course, namely the Sydney trip. 
4. Correction and digression are never inferred un­
less the NLI provides evidence to this effect by 
means of cue phrases, such as "on second thought" 
and "by the way," respectively. 
The above considerations are domain independent, 
since the probability of a specific relation Rm is de­
termined by the cue words returned by the NLI and 
by the contents of the interpretations ik and Ij. Do­
main knowledge of distances is not taken into consid­
eration while calculating the probability of the relation 
Rm. However, the probability of going to Hawaii on 
the way between Sydney and Melbourne is definitely 
lower than the probability of going to Sydney on the 
way between Melbourne and Hawaii. If domain knowl­
edge is available, it should be incorporated into the 
system to update the probabilities obtained using the 
domain independent considerations discussed above. 
312 Raskutti and Zukerman 
3.3 PRUNING THE SET OF 
INTERPRETATIONS USING THEIR 
PROBABILITIES 
After determining the probabilities of a set of interpre­
tations, the probabilities are normalized. The normal­
ized probabilities are used to prune the set of inter­
pretations by dropping all those interpretations whose 
probabilities fall below a relative rejection threshold. 
In principle, the improbable interpretations could be 
maintained and revisited, if necessary. But, empiri­
cally, this has not been necessary since the intended 
interpretation has been found among the retained in­
terpretations. All the interpretations I that are re­
tained have a probability that satisfies the following 
condition: 
-..!.!___ > Threshold 
Pmax -
where Pmax is the maximum of all the normalized 
probabilities, PI is the probability of a retained inter­
pretation, and Threshold is a number in [0,1) range. 
This calculation ensures that interpretations with a 
low probability relative to the most probable interpre­
tation are dropped. For example, with 0.5 as the value 
for Threshold, an interpretation with probability 0.3 
is dropped if there is another interpretation with prob­
ability 0.7. At the same time, if there is a situation 
where there are three interpretations with probability 
0.4, 0.3 and 0.3, then all three are retained. 
By judicious choice of a value for Threshold, the sys­
tem can be tailored to consider more or less possibil­
ities. For instance, currently we have two thresholds. 
The first one used during the direct inference process 
is 0.5 and was chosen in line with the probabilities 
assigned to the discourse relations, so that plausible 
interpretations are not discarded. The second thresh­
old, which is used to prune the interpretations after 
the indirect inference process, is 0.7, and was chosen 
so that fewer possibilities are considered as additional 
information is brought to bear. 
4 STRENGTH OF INFERENCES 
We postulate that the strength of an inference is di­
rectly proportional to the reliability of the informa­
tion source that is used as the basis for this inference. 
Hence, we categorize different information sources that 
are used to draw inferences and list them below in de­
creasing order of reliability. 
1. User's Statements- Direct inferences from what 
is explicitly stated. While these inferences can be 
presumed correct, there is still a degree of uncer­
tainty in relating a new statement to the earlier 
ones due to the different discourse relations pos­
sible. 
2. Domain Knowledge- Indirect inferences that are 
derived by using the system's beliefs about the 
user's domain knowledge. A typical example is 
the inference of the arrival time at the destina­
tion once the departure time is known. Such an 
inference is useful when there are multiple legs 
in a proposed journey, requiring that departure 
times at subsequent locations be inferred. 
3. Domain Assumptions - Indirect inferences that 
are derived by assuming what is normal in the 
domain. For example, when no details about the 
mode of travel are specified, it is possible to derive 
this information from the usual mode of transport 
between two places. 
4. User Model- Indirect inferences that arc made 
on the basis of the system's model of the user. 
The user model may be a default model describ­
ing a typical user, or it may be more specific. In 
the context of a travel agency, we have adopted a 
default model based on the assumption that typi­
cally, in a travel agency, the information provider 
cannot form an extensive user model. 
5. Common-Sense- Indirect inferences that are de­
rived by assuming normal behavior or common 
notions outside the domain of interest. Typically, 
such notions are used when we postulate return 
journeys based on the assumption that people 
usually do not move from their residence. 
The inference types are assigned a strength in the (0,1] 
range, and this strength is used to calculate the infor­
mation content of a parameter and also to determine 
whether a particular parameter should be revised by 
a new inference during the indirect inference process. 
The inferences derived from the user's statements have 
a strength of 1 and all other inference types have a 
progressively decreasing strength according to the re­
liability of their source of information. Undefined pa­
rameters are assigned a minimum strength. This as­
signment enables us to distinguish between parameters 
that are defined inexactly by the user and parame­
ters that are left undefined, and assign less information 
content to undefined parameters. 
In the process of deriving indirect inferences, we em­
ulate one aspect of human behavior whereby once a 
conclusion is accepted with a particular degree of con­
fidence, people consider it to be certain when drawing 
subsequent conclusions (Gettys, Kelly and Peterson 
1982). Thus, like Carberry (1990), we do not com­
pound the uncertainty in chains of inferences. This 
approach is different from that used for the compu­
tation of confidence factors (CFs) in MYCIN, where 
the CF of a parameter P is computed by taking into 
account the CFs of the parameters P1, P2, ... , Pn that 
are used for calculating P (Shortliffe and Buchanan 
1975). Our approach is implemented by tagging each 
parameter, P, in the plans in each interpretation with 
the type of inference that gave rise to the value of P, 
without taking into consideration the inference types 
of P1, P2, ... , Pn. Since the type of inference indicates 
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the strength of the inference rule, it represents the con­
ditional probability of P, given P1, Pz, ... , Pn. 
During the indirect inference process, the strength of 
the inference in a parameter's tag is compared with the 
strength of a new inference, before updating the pa­
rameter with the new inference. If the strength of the 
new inference is the same or higher than the strength 
of the inference type in the tag, the new inference re­
places the old one. Otherwise, the old inference is re­
tained. In this manner, a weaker inference is prevented 
from refuting the results obtained from a stronger in­
ference. 
Thus, during the indirect inference process, the gaps 
left in the interpretations generated by the direct infer­
ence process are filled in using the most reliable indi­
rect inference, and unreliable inferences are not main­
tained. In principle, it is necessary to generate a new 
interpretation for each new value of a parameter, and 
process all the generated interpretations. However, 
this can lead to an exponential explosion of possibili­
ties, and our decision to consider only the strongest 
inference during the indirect inference process is a 
trade-off between the benefits of exploring all possibil­
ities and the resource limitations for doing so (Horvitz 
1989). 
5 INFORMATION CONTENT AND 
ITS USE 
The information content of an interpretation is a mea­
sure of the extent of its definition. After both direct 
and indirect inferences, this measure is used both to 
determine if the processing is to be continued as well 
as to modify the probabilities of the interpretations so 
that the probabilities of interpretations with a higher 
information content are increased. The modified prob­
abilities are used to prune the set of interpretations as 
described in Section 3.3. 
5.1 THE INFORMATION CONTENT OF 
AN INTERPRETATION 
We define the information content of an interpretation 
as the sum of the information content of all the plans 
in the interpretation, and the information content of a 
plan as the sum of the information content of all the 
parameters that are necessary for the definition of the 
plan. The information content of a parameter, in turn, 
depends on two factors: (1) its specificity, which is de­
fined as the reciprocal of the number of possible values 
assigned to this parameter, and (2) its strength, which 
depends on the source of information from which this 
parameter was obtained. That is, both a parameter 
with multiple values assigned to it and a parameter 
derived from an unreliable source of information are 
deemed to have a low information content. 
We borrow from Information Theory (Shannon 1948), 
to define the information content of a parameter p, 
IC(p), as follows: 
S(p) IC(p) = log2 N(p) 
where N(p) is the number of possible values assigned 
to p, and S(p) is the strength associated with p. The 
strength of the parameter is the strength of the in­
ference type that was used to derive the value of the 
parameter (Section 4.2). 
According to this formula, undefined parameters have 
the least information content, since they can take on 
all the possible values in the domain, and parameters 
inferred exactly from a reliable source, such as a direct 
inference from a user's statement, have a ma.ximum in­
formation content. For instance, if we have directly in­
ferred that the departure date for a trip is between the 
9th and the 15th of May, 1991, then the information 
content of this parameter is log2 1/7. This measure 
is additive over multiple plans and it ranges over the 
negative values, with a maximum information content 
of 0 when all the parameters which are necessary for 
the definition of a plan are exactly defined. Thus, the 
information content of an interpretation I, IC(I), is: 
I C(I) = '\' '\' I S(p;) D D og z N( ) {plans Pj in I} {parameters p; in Pj} Pi 
5.2 CHECKING COMPLETION 
After the direct inference process and during the in­
direct inference process, the information content mea­
sure is used to determine if the processing should be 
continued. Processing is stopped if at least one com­
plete interpretation, i.e., an interpretation with zero 
information content is determined. Processing of an 
interpretation is also stopped if no new inferences can 
be drawn on the basis of the existing evidence, i.e., 
the information content of an interpretation cannot be 
increased further. Thus, the information content mea­
sure is used as an informative stopping rule (Berger 
and Berry 1988) to determine if the processing should 
be stopped. 
5.3 UPDATING PROBABILITIES 
The information content measure, which ranges over 
the negative values, is mapped to the [0,1] range and 
then used to update the probability of an interpreta­
tion, P(I). This is performed by means of the follow­
ing formula: 
P(I) <- P(I) ( 1 - IC(I) ) ICNORM 
ICNORM is currently defined to be the minimum 
possible information content in the domain. In our 
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restricted domain, where the number of possible des­
tinations and origins is low, this choice of 1CNORM 
has a large impact on the probability. However, in 
a realistic domain, where there is a greater degree of 
freedom in terms of the values that can be assigned to 
the parameters, another definition of 1CNORM may 
be preferred. Currently, we are experimenting with 
1CNORM as the sum of the information content of 
all the interpretations, and use this definition to up­
date the probabilities when there are multiple inter­
pretations. The update of probabilities using informa­
tion content is valid only in cooperative information­
seeking interactions, such as those occurring at a travel 
agency, where the user wants his/her intentions to be 
understood by the listener and hence, interpretations 
with higher information content are more probable. 
6 EXAMPLES 
Our system has been implemented to understand dis­
courses in travel domain. The language used for the 
implementation is Franz Lisp. Our system has a rule­
base containing twelve rules and a plan-base contain­
ing seven plan operators. The input to the system is in 
the form of predicates, and the system produces out­
put in the form of possible interpretations consisting 
of one or more plans that the user proposes to carry 
out. To illustrate the inference process, we consider 
two plausible dialogue excerpts at a Melbourne travel 
agency. 
EXAMPLE 1 
Traveler: "I want to go to Sydney the day after to­
morrow. I am going to Hawaii on the 11:00 am 
flight. By the way, I'll be leaving from Adelaide." 
This chunk of statements issued by a traveler is re­
turned by the NLI as the followiJ?g four predicates, 
where the last two predicates are due to the third sen­
tence: 
(1) Go (departure._date = day after tomorrow, 
destination = Sydney) 
(2) FLY (departure._ time = 11:00 am, 
destination = Hawaii) 
(3) DIGRESS 
(4) LEAVE (origin= Adelaide) 
The first two domain predicates give rise to an inter­
pretation composed of two plans: (a) to go to Sydney 
and (b) to fly to Hawaii at 11:00 am. The DIGRESS 
discourse relation in predicate (3) indicates that a plan 
which precedes the plan currently in focus is likely to 
be the topic of discussion for the forthcoming predi­
cate. Thus, with the fourth predicate, we have two 
possible interpretations: h -it elaborates plan (a), 
or h -it elaborates plan (b). h has a higher prob­
ability due to the presence of the DIGRESS discourse 
relation. 
The information content measure rates both these in­
terpretations equally. Hence, both interpretations are 
retained after the direct inference process. During 
the indirect inference process, we consider the case 
where the temporal order of plans is assumed to be the 
same as the order of presentation during the discourse. 
Other possible temporal orders are considered and pro­
cessed in [Raskutti and Zukerman 1991]. The use of 
indirect inference rules coupled with the assumption 
for temporal order of plans gives rise to two scenarios: 
h Adelaide -+ Sydney -> Hawaii 
h Melbourne ->Sydney, Adelaide ->Hawaii 
h has less information content, since its parameters 
cannot be inferred due to the need to postulate an ad­
ditional intervening plan to take the user from Sydney 
to Adelaide. Hence its probability is correspondingly 
decreased and 11 is chosen as the best interpretation. 
EXAMPLE 2 
Traveler: "I want to go to Sydney the day after to­
morrow. From Sydney I'll be going to Hawaii on 
the 11:00 am flight. I'll be leaving from Adelaide." 
This chunk of statements issued by a traveler is re­
turned by the NLI as the following three predicates. 
(1) Go (departure._date = day after tomorrow, 
destination = Sydney) 
(2) FLY (departure._time = 11:00 am, 
origin = Sydney 
destination = Hawaii) 
(3) LEAVE (origin= Adelaide) 
The first two domain predicates give rise to an inter­
pretation composed of two plans: (a) to go to Sydney 
and (b) to fly to Hawaii from Sydney at 11:00 am. 
With the third predicate, we have two possible inter­
pretations: h -it elaborates plan (a), or h - it 
introduces a new plan (c) to go from Adelaide. The 
probability of 11 is higher since elaboration is preferred 
to introduction. However, since the elaboration is that 
of a plan discussed before, 12 is retained as a possibil­
ity. Thus after the direct inference process, we have 
two possibilities: 
h Adelaide -+Sydney, 
Sydney -> Hawaii 
h ?x-> Sydney, 
Sydney -> Hawaii, 
Adelaide -> ?y 
h has higher information content since the origins and 
destinations of the two proposed trips are known. This 
coupled with the previous lower probability of 12 en­
sures that h is the only possibility carried over to the 
indirect inference process. Thus, during the indirect 
inference process, !1 is completed to yield the same 
interpretation as the one in the first example. 
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7 CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper, we have described a means for handling 
uncertainty during plan recognition in task-oriented 
consultation systems by using Bayesian probability 
theory augmented by an information content measure. 
We have used our system on five simple discourse sam­
ples similar to the one discussed in Section 6. In 
each case, the system chooses the same interpretation 
that people choose, indicating that our tenet of link­
ing specificity and strength of inference to the proba­
bility of an interpretation can be valuable in handling 
real conversations in cooperative interactions. Finally, 
by modifying the definition of the information content 
measure to suit different domains, our method may be 
used for interpreting user's statements in general, as 
well as in the area of multi-media document retrieval. 
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